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When the Remington typewriter was patented in the 1870s a new era in the production of text was inaugurated. This turn towards a mechanized age of writing was clearly connected to various technological developments throughout the nineteenth century – including the invention of the phonograph, the telegraph system, photography and film.​[1]​ Taken together, these developments made for a dominant form of modern experience: creating a world in which Martin Heidegger feared the human would become of instrumental use only. But Heidegger also wrote specifically, though briefly, on the typewriter and his thoughts on this topic are not so easily placed within his wider thesis on the revelatory and yet tyrannical quality of techne. Rather, what comes through in Heidegger’s writing on the typewriter is a concern with the fate of the hand. Heidegger writes that ‘the typewriter tears writing from the essential realm of the hand’, a feature that is deeply connected to the way in which ‘the typewriter makes everyone look the same’.​[2]​ As the hand is removed, it seems, identity is made blank. Taking inspiration from Heidegger, more recent work, circulating around the ‘discourse networks’ of Friedrich Kittler, has emphasised this ‘cutting off’ enacted by the typewriter: a view that is stridently resisted by Steven Connor, who argues that ‘far from being amputated by the new typographic and phonographic machines, the hand is reduplicated: in the typewriter, the corona of levers operated by the keys irresistibly takes on the shape of a multiply-fingered hand’.​[3]​




In Guy de Maupassant’s macabre short-story from 1875, an examining magistrate entertains his audience (a group of spellbound ladies) with a tale he characterises as ‘inexplicable’. The events recounted involve his meetings, some years, earlier, with an Englishman on the island of Corsica – with that location’s obsession with vengeance being a particularly apt context for the story that unfolds. The Englishman, Sir John Rowell, is an imposing and robust figure, whom the narrator meets whilst out hunting. The story begins to take on its sinister edge when Sir John’s stories of hunting various animals concludes with his statement that ‘I’ve done a lot of man-hunting too’.​[4]​ Immediately following these lines, and as the narrator is shown round Sir John’s home, he sees a strange object placed on a square of red velvet:

It was a hand, a human hand. Not the hand of a skeleton, white and clean, but a black, dried-up hand, with yellow nails. The muscles had been laid bare, and there were traces of dried blood like dirt on the bones, which had been cut clean through, as if with an axe, about the middle of the forearm. (GDM, 254-5)

Strange enough already, the hand is also fastened to the wall with an iron chain. It transpires that the hand belonged to Sir John’s ‘worst enemy’, a man of exceptional strength (though Sir John was stronger) whose continued presence, via the hand, is clearly still feared. When the narrator points out that, as a dead object, the hand does not need to be chained up, Sir John responds: ‘it’s always trying to get away. That chain is necessary’ (GDM, 255). Some time later Sir John is found dead in his home with no sign of a window or door having been forced. The cause of death is strangulation and the doctor who examines the body declares that ‘it looks as if he had been strangled by a skeleton’ (GDM, 256). Upon glancing towards the wall, the narrator finds that the gruesome hand is no longer in its place, later discovering a single of its digits in the mouth of Sir John, having been bitten off at the knuckle. The crime remains unsolved, the narrator describing a ‘terrifying nightmare’ some three months later in which the hand appears in his own room ‘running like a scorpion or a spider across my curtains and walls [...] galloping round my room, using its fingers as legs’ (GDM, 257). The next day the hand is brought to him, having been found on Sir John’s grave, its index finger missing. The story is concluded with the narrator’s rational explanation, that ‘the rightful owner of the hand was not dead at all’ (GDM, 258) and had come to reclaim it. The ladies who have listened to the story remain unconvinced.
	This story is uncanny – and it is precisely because of the apparent action of the hand that it is so. The fear of castration implied by this severed limb (a theme not wholly irrelevant to the points about agency which follow) is, however, not quite the Freudian return that is most significant. For, rather than enacting an oblique repetition of desires, wishes or anxieties what has really ‘come into the open’ here is nothing other than the embodied relationship between mind and hand, between cognition and action.​[5]​ The fluid connection between these terms – the way in which the hand cognizes as the mind also acts – is a matter of intuitive significance and has found recent critical exposure in medic/philosopher Raymond Tallis’s study, The Hand: a Philosophical Inquiry into Human Being (2003). For Tallis, the hand has been the mechanism by which humanity has differentiated itself from the rest of the living world. As he puts it: ‘through the hand, human culture waves away animal nature’.​[6]​ Not limited to the well-known opposability of our thumbs, this is, for Tallis, more accurately considered in relation to the wealth of manipulative movements the human hand is capable of. In a chapter entitled ‘The Genius of Reaching’, for instance, he asks his reader to question what is involved in this seemingly simple task. Picking something up, it turns out, begins with an initial assessment of the location and shape of the desired object. Almost instantaneously the hand is then set in motion, accelerating rapidly and altering its route in order to traverse any obstacles. While on the way, the wrist is cocked and the fingers adjusted to form a gripping position (itself an immensely complex choice of possible options) Finally, as the hand nears its object it must decelerate at just the right rate in order to avoid knocking the object over (RT, 50). The apparent simplicity of this task should be dispelled by a consideration of a robotic arm in action, where untold terabytes of computer memory and programming create an arm and hand capable of only the most clunking and inhuman version of grasping. In this context, the action of a robot (a mechanism not gifted with consciousness) is peculiarly effective in laying bare what conscious reaching would look like. That is to say, if we were to really think about reaching and grasping we would look like automatons as we did so. 
Of course, most bodily actions are similarly governed by unconscious, habitual, mechanisms – but the complexity of possible manipulations embodied by the hand’s activity make it the most telling example of the body’s apparently independent agency. Yet this reduction of conscious will in the act of reaching and grasping is balanced with the fact that it is what was initially wanted – what the will desired – that subsequently ends up in one’s hand. Tallis sums up this interplay of conscious will and unconscious activity nicely:

[Reaching] cannot be entirely driven by conscious agency; it has to be predicated on (cerebral) mechanism(s) - more specifically on the availability of tailor-made motor programmes that can be requisitioned as required.
On the other hand, the action cannot be entirely downloaded to mechanisms because we would have no sense of doing it; nor could we relate it in a meaningful and flexible way to the flickering network of our evolving, highly specific and personal intentions and the unique world of meaning into which they are inserted (RT, 2)

The hand is thus incorporated into a consciously apprehended world of meaning – but only in a half-autonomous way which makes it seem to be at once ours and yet not ours. This is precisely the effect which is at the heart of the uncanny quality of Maupassant’s story. In his essay on the uncanny Freud too quickly dismisses the way in which uncanniness is often evoked when a supposedly inanimate object is made animate – and the mobililty of the dead hand does seem to shock at this level to some extent. But the horror that the narrator feels during his nightmare of the hand running around ‘using its fingers as legs’ is only truly significant because of the very Freudian way in which it displaces our everyday experience of the hand. In normality the hand is attached to our bodies but is forgotten about and acts somewhat on its own – in the story, this feature of our embodied experience is made starkly evident by the depiction of a hand that is similarly independent and yet connected to its owner. However, the emphasis here lies prominently on the side of conscious human agency. Thus, the hand may well be cut off from the rest of the body, but it carries out the apparent wishes of a governing mind to the letter. Sir John’s worst enemy is still in control of the hand, whether beyond the grave or not – indeed, this terrifying figure is somehow in the hand, or expressed by its actions. The hand therefore has an agent: its actions have an author. 
The interplay of conscious will and unconscious activity is implicit in all the hand’s activity, but the specific act of reaching and grasping is about more than this. As Tallis puts it: ‘behind the genius of reaching is a deeper genius: the sense that things are there to be reached, the intuition of reachables’ (RT, 151). Reaching and grasping thus emphasise the subject’s embodied presence in space: I am here, the object I want is over there. More than this, the basic perception of objects, as objects, is fundamentally connected to their approximation with the subject’s egocentric space. In this sense, it is no accident that Heidegger’s formulation of Dasein posits an encounter with the external world that is ‘ready-to-hand’.​[7]​ Reaching and grasping, in this existential stance, is both a metaphor for, and the primal example of, the way in which the external world is there-for-me – available to be manipulated.
	The human dimension of this manipulation has been governed by a conception of the object as both material to be shaped and as potential shaping device. One of Tallis’s key stages in his hypothesised development of man is the way in which tool-use is predicated upon a conception of the hand itself as tool. Tallis terms apparent animal tool use as only pseudo-tool-use, fundamentally lacking 'the notion of instrumentality, which is rooted in the notion of the hand itself, and subsequently the body, as an instrument and ourselves as operating on the world. The relationship to the world mediated through tools is possible only against the backdrop of a relationship to our own bodies grasped as tools; more specifically of the body as the support for the hand grasped as a tool’ (RT, 38). What we get out of this instrumentality is far more than the mere fulfilment of our base desires though. For Tallis, the huge range of manipulative activity that is carried out by the hand in this sense of it as a tool leads to knowledge – as the human organism manipulates more, via the hand, its brain learns more, which help it to manipulate in more complex ways. Loops of positive feedback are thus set up up which fuel human development. The ultimate knowledge/tool created by this process is the creation of language. Tallis is, here, inspired by rather obscure comments from Heidegger, who writes that:

The hand is infinitely different from all grasping organs – paws, claws, or fangs – different by an abyss of essence. Only a being who can speak, that is, think, can have hands and be handy in achieving works of handicraft. [...] Every motion of the hand in every one of its works carries itself through the element of thinking, every bearing of the hand bears itself in that element. All the work of the hand is rooted in thinking.​[8]​

Friedrich Kittler too, in Gramophone, Film, Typewriter contends that ‘man himself acts through the hand; for the hand is, together with the word, the essential distinction of man. Only a being which, like man, “has” the word, can and must “have” “the hand”’.​[9]​
	Connecting the hand to language development in the way in which Heidegger, Kittler and Tallis envisage does involve a certain epistemological leap. Rather like the modern philosophical retrieval of a ‘state of nature’ it requires a return to a time before language itself – the account can therefore be extremely convincing without ever being verifiable. What is less problematic is to see the intimate relationship that has existed, over time, between the hand and the production of text. This is, of course, nowhere more apparent than in the action of handwriting, where the fingers enclose the pencil just as Maupassant’s fearful hand, it is imagined, grips Sir John’s neck. Handwriting, in fact, is often shortened to the very entity which enables its presence – the rendering of one’s ‘hand’ occurring in the fluid contact between nib and paper. Such writing involves an essential relationship with touch: as Constance Classen points out, ‘writing is tactile in nature. The etymological meaning of the verb to write is to scratch’.​[10]​ But, more crucially, handwriting is about reaching and grasping. The tool with which handwriting is enacted – the pen or pencil – is grasped by the hand and directed towards the external world of surface on which its traces are actively applied. The writing tool here becomes the extension of the hand that grasps its potential. As such, handwriting is, though enacted somewhat unconsciously, emblematic of the subject’s ability to engage meaningfully with a world that is ready-to-hand. In other words, to write in one’s own hand is to represent one’s definitive existence within a world that is available to be shaped.
According to Tamara Plakins Thornton’s cultural history Handwriting in America it was with the early-modern development of print that handwritten script took on its distinctive significance in this sense. Unlike print, script retained its connection to the physical act of writing – and thus was able to accrue a degree of symbolic significance in terms of what it said beyond the level of its linguistic meaning. In charting the various ‘symbolic meanings’ of handwriting that ensued in the following centuries Thornton provides an account of the way in which a person’s ‘hand’ became one of  ‘the places where the self happened’.​[11]​ In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for example, Thornton reports that ‘penmanship manuals conditioned their readers to focus as much on the movement that produced handwriting as on the visual effect of the completed script. When viewing a script, one could imagine how it had been executed - with a leisured motion of the hand in the case of the gentleman, a delicate touch or a bold arm in the case of other writers’ (TPT, 33). Handwriting, in this period, was regarded as a form of ‘self-presentation but not self-expression’ (TPT, 41). Rather than truly unique individuality it was ‘those aspects of the individual that constituted identity in the eighteenth century - gender, status, and occupation - [which] were inscribed by the pen as surely as the ostensible message of the text.' (TPT, 41).
This idea of scripts that aptly represented an individual’s position in terms of status, gender and occupation gave way, in the nineteenth century, to a deliberate project of character formation where the moral fibre of the self took shape in the forming of characters on the page. In parallel with this view grew an extremely influential theory of penmansip: namely that ‘handwriting is unique to the individual’ (TPT, 73). This idea of a truly unique self being contained in handwritten script was being recognized in a variety of cultural forms. The pseudo-science of graphology – in which essential character traits were discerned from samples of handwriting – became immensely popular in newspapers and magazines in the nineteenth century. In a more practical sense, the identity which script aided to ‘happen’ was utilised by courts of law. Prior to the seventeenth century, handwriting expertise didn’t exist. But, in his treatise on evidence from 1726, Geoffrey Gilbert expressed the opinion that ‘men are distinguished by their handwriting as well as by their faces, for it is very seldom that the shape of their letters agree any more than the shapes of their bodies’ (TPT, 35). In its earliest incarnations this kind of evidence was restricted to evidence of people who had a familiarity with the originator’s hand – but it developed, in the nineteenth century, along with a range of expert witnessing to encompass the testimony of apparently ‘objective’ specialists. Unlike graphologists, handwriting experts were not interested in the sense of what handwriting said about an individual’s character – only that it was their handwriting and no one else’s. Yet what these interconnected manifestations of handwriting’s significance did was posit an irresistible bond between the inner life and the outer sign. As Mark Seltzer puts it, ‘the linking of hand, eye, and letter in the act of writing by hand intimates the translation from mind to hand to eye and hence from the inward and invisible and spiritual to the outward and visible and physical’.​[12]​ 





Written some eighty-five years after Maupassant’s ‘The Hand’, Lawrence Durrell’s Clea (1960) – which forms the final part of his modernist-inspired Alexandrian Quartet – contains a scene which represents the changing role of the hand in textual production during the intervening period: changes which can also be related to the development of literary theory in the early to mid-twentieth century. Near the end of the novel, Clea, the title character, is trapped underwater in a bizarre harpooning accident, her body nailed to a wrecked boat via a pierced right hand. The narrator of the novel, Darley, who is Clea’s lover, attempts to extricate the harpoon but, this proving hopeless, he takes a knife to Clea’s limb, cutting the hand off at the wrist. Clea is brought to the surface but appears to be dead. Darley attempts to resuscitate her, eventually noticing ‘the lungs respond slowly to my hand’.​[14]​ This ‘forcible rebirth’ is ultimately completed, an act which brings Darley even closer to Clea: ‘as if, by bringing her to life, I had made her, in a way, my own property’ (LD, 854). 
Some time later, and as Darley and Clea are spending some time apart, he receives a letter ‘addressed to me in an unknown hand’. The letter begins:

You did not recognize it, did you? I mean the handwriting on the envelope? I confess that I chuckled as I addressed it to you, before beginning this letter: I could see your face all of a sudden with its expression of perplexity. I saw you turn the letter over in your fingers for a moment trying to guess who had sent it!
It is the first serious letter I have attempted, apart from short notes, with my new hand: this strange accessory-after-the-fact with which the good Amaril has equipped me! I wanted it to become word-perfect before I wrote to you. Of course I was frightened and disgusted by it at first, as you can imagine. But I have come to respect it very much, this delicate and beautiful steel contrivance which lies beside me so quietly on the table in its green velvet glove! (LD, 873-4).

Clea’s fake limb allows her to disappear in her own text, a certain pleasure attaching itself to this new-found anonymity. Yet, while Darley, it is imagined, struggles to find identity in the script, significantly turning the letter over in his fingers, Clea’s new hand seems peculiarly present and absent from the scene of writing. Ostensibly, the hand is the very topic of the prose, the content of Clea’s narrative reporting the scribal effects of her ‘accessory-after-the-fact’. And yet, it also seems to be the case that the ‘beautiful steel contrivance’, apparently at the very time of writing, remains lying quietly beside her ‘on the table in its green velvet glove’. Unlike Maupassant’s hand, this prosthetic device is therefore divorced from the moment at which Clea speaks of her innermost feelings.
Even more significantly, Clea, who is a frustrated artist despondent about her artistic ability, develops a love for her new hand when she discovers that ‘IT can paint’ (LD, 874). Clea reports that ‘one day it took up a brush and lo! Pictures of truly troubling originality and authority were born. I have five of them now. I stare at them with reverent wonder. Where did they come from? But I know that the Hand was responsible’ (LD, 874).
The  originality of Clea’s pictures is troubling for the same reason that Maupassant’s story is uncanny – because the hand appears to be working alone. Yet, whereas the severed hand in Maupassant acts out the wishes of its ‘owner’, undertaking a crime of which Sir John’s worst enemy is ‘author’, Clea’s pictures have ‘authority’ precisely because she is somehow not in them. She can talk of them with ‘the utmost objectivity, for I know I am not responsible. It is the Hand alone which has contrived to slip me through the barriers’ into true artistry (LD, 874). What began as a description which seemed to describe Clea’s rebirth under the resuscitating hands of Darley thus becomes a creation of art via the instrument of a fake limb – ushering Clea into a world of aesthetic accomplishment to which, it is implied by the end of the novel, Darley will follow, finding a new beginning for his own frustrated efforts as a writer.
	In what follows, it will be argued that Durrell’s representation of the hand resonates with developments in the way in which the hand was both read and produced writing in the early-to-mid-twentieth century. But before developing these themes it is worth noting the congruence that exists between Clea’s anonymous writing and the doubts which had developed over handwriting analysis by the end of the nineteenth century. Two famous legal cases had a devastating effect in this regard. The first of these was the famous Dreyfus affair. Although Dreyfus was found guilty predominantly due to the evidence of a secret, and duplicitously compiled file, the submitted, visible evidence was not completely without weight. The most significant element of this was the comparison made between Dreyfus’ handwriting and that of the bordereau (the incriminating document written by a German spy). Those investigating Dreyfus had, at the outset of the inquiry, utilised expert analysis in this regard. Alphonse Bertillon XE "Bertillon, Alphonse"  reported that ‘Dreyfus had to have written the bordereau'.​[15]​ 
	The supposed connection posited between thought, expression, the physical act of writing, and the written word by handwriting analysts is particularly apparent in the way Dreyfus was investigated. Once Dreyfus had been identified as a suspect they ordered him to attend the office of Commandant Du Paty de Clam, who fed him a story about having injured his hand and needing someone to take dictation. Du Paty de Clam then read to Dreyfus from a script that contained several of the words and phrases found in the bordereau. This method of investigation, referred to as the obtaining of a ‘lettre d’expérience’,​[16]​ was designed to obtain proof of Dreyfus’ hand, but the army already had samples of this. The underlying motivation for the lettre d’expérience was, rather, to connect the written word with the writing subject. The investigators desired to witness the concrete existence of the hand, as it traced the specific individual’s experience of writing. It has even been reported that they had Dreyfus write in a variety of ways (with gloves on, lying down etc.) in order for the connection to become fully illuminated by his physical positioning and dress while writing the bordereau.​[17]​ 
A less famous trial, though one which made a significant impact on the development of English law, was the trial of Adolf Beck. Beck was first tried in 1896 for a series of confidence tricks over the previous eighteen months in which affluent women were fleeced of both cash and jewellery.​[18]​ A pattern of very similar crimes had taken place in 1877, with a conviction being made, and it was thought that this recent spate was the work of the same criminal. Letters had been exchanged as part of the confidence trick. A comparison was made between those sent in 1877 and those in 1894-5 and the judgment made that they were the work of the same hand. It was not until Beck’s release, and subsequent arrest for a further spate of crimes in 1904, that his mistaken identity was discovered. 
These high-profile cases had an incredibly damaging effect upon the use of handwriting for the purposes of identification. However, at almost precisely the same point in time, a new form of identification via the hand was coming into being as the the first United Kingdom Fingerprint Bureau was set up in 1901. Prior to this, a combination of eyewitness testimony, registers of distinctive marks, and photographic mug-shots were used. All these methods had weaknesses in their reliance upon subjective recognition. Fingerprints by contrast, and as reported by the Troup Committee, set up in 1897 to examine the potential of fingerprints as a system of identification: ‘are absolute impressions taken from the body itself under conditions which eliminate error as regards transcription or recording'.​[19]​ The taking of fingerprints very quickly became the pre-eminent method of criminal identification in jurisdictions throughout the world: a rapid success that was built upon a belief in the infallibility of fingerprint analysis that is broadly still in existence today. Significantly, this new method of identification posited unique identity in a previously unnoticed fragment of a once wholly conceived of body – but the technical application of fingerprinting, in which prints were taken from the individual, was also of crucial importance. As Ronald Thomas notes, the technique involved the pressing of fingers on to 'a piece of paper as if they were the individual letters of a printing press’.​[20]​ In other words, the fingers produced a printed text rather than a handwritten script.
Fingerprint analysis relied fundamentally on a logic of identification rather than recognition. While earlier methods of identification had taken the individual as a whole and as they appeared to the naked eye, comparing this image with either memory, description or photograph, fingerprint analysts never compared the filed print with the originating hand: rather it was in a comparison of taken prints (moments of transitory touch) that individuality was revealed. Thomas describes it is a particularly telling example of the late nineteenth-century’s ‘systematic transformation of the notion of the individual citizen's essential reality from something we call "character" to something we came to call "identity".​[21]​ While character was recognizable, the identity found in the fingerprint, by contrast, was inherently unrecognizable. No one without the requisite training could be expected to make a match of prints. Even more fundamentally, no layman could realistically be expected to successfully identify their own prints. In producing an identity that was ‘represented by an abstract image' discernible only to a select few, fingerprint analysis created an individuality that at once inhered in the print and yet disappeared in its abstraction.​[22]​ 
The fingerprint divulges identity in moments of reaching – but this is a touch that is crucially different to the grasping and active shaping of the world discussed earlier in relation to handwriting. Rather than holding a pen and making visible markings on a physical surface, fingerprinting found identity in the leftovers of momentary touch. Symbolically, this placed identity in precisely what was left behind – crucially, though, not what was left behind in terms of an active human agency which had acted upon the world in a significant sense. Fingerprints, by contrast, are initially invisible traces which leave no mark of the meaningful activity that they may have been the result of. The criminological terminology is, in this sense, instructive as the prints discovered by the ‘dusting’ of a crime scene are referred to as ‘latents’ – a labelling which emphasises their psychopathological existence as unintentional smears on the external world.
	It is in precisely this context of a movement from grasping a pen to touching a surface that the invention of the typewriter, and its influence upon literary production and theory, should be considered. In this sense, its importance can be thought of in terms of Sara Danius’s claim that 'technology is in a specific sense constitutive of high-modernist aesthetics’.​[23]​ Just how advanced the technology of the typewriter was, though, is worth considering and Heidegger’s description of the typewriter as an ‘intermediate thing between a tool and a machine’ is instructive on this point.​[24]​ Tools, as Margaret Mead put it, follow ‘the rhythm of the body’ – and the pen is a fine example of this – it’s activity essentially acting as an extension only of what the hand, by scratching or drawing in the sand for instance, could already do. In this context, it is worth noting that the earliest forerunner of a writing machine, William Petty’s 1647 pantograph, was designed to 'reproduce the hand of the writer as closely as possible’.​[25]​ The machine, by contrast ‘is not body patterned. It has its own existence, its own rhythm, to which man must submit’.​[26]​ The contemporary world is thus the machine age – an era in which the flick of a given switch can set an array of different processes into play. As Tallis points out, this is, importantly, a time in which the hand is often set to work not in the manual work of craft but, rather, in the abstract action of initiating actions by the press of a button: a 'Demanualisation of tool-use’ which he associates with ‘depersonalisation’ (RT, 236).
	The modern typewriter, invented by Christopher Latham Sholes in the early 1870s and subsequently produced by the Remington company, is not quite a member of this era. However, there is no doubt that there is a qualitative difference between the early-modern pantograph which replicated the hand and the recognizable layout of levers and QWERTY keyboard that comprised Sholes’ design. With the typewriter, a gap emerges between the action of the hand and its result. In punching at a keyboard, with singular movements of the fingers, text appears – an effect in which minimal, transitory , touch causes letters and words to be shot out of a steel mechanism. As Friedrich Kittler puts it: 'The typewriter became a discursive machine-gun’ (if this language seems hyperbolic we should consider the fact that Remington were predominantly gun manufacturers).​[27]​ Amongst other things, what this machine-gun hits, and kills, is the presence of unique individuality in the writer’s words. The idea that the typewriter standardized writing is crucial in this sense. Kittler argues that ‘in standardized texts, paper and body, writing and soul fall apart. Typewriters do not store individuals’, a view glossed by Christopher Keep when he notes that ‘where once handwriting maintained and made visible the uniqueness and particularity of the individual, the typewriter severs the connection between self and utterance, introducing in its stead a form of writing free of any origin exterior to its own system.’​[28]​ 
In fact, typewriters actually all produce slightly different ‘type’ – a fact announced firstly in the fictional realm with Sherlock Holmes statement that the typewriter has 'quite as much individuality as a man's handwriting' (though it should be noted that, rather like the discernment of different sets of fingerprints, the distinguishing of ‘types’ is really a job for an expert).​[29]​ But there is also a resistance to viewing identity in type that is born from the method of its production rather than the product itself. When Heidegger comments that ‘the typewriter makes everyone look the same’ he refers to more than simply the product that emerges from this semantic ‘black box’.​[30]​ What I want to suggest, rather, is that even more than the fact that it produces seemingly identical text rather than script, or the way in which it depicts literary endeavour in its atomic constituent form of letters, the fundamental thing about the typewriter is the way in which the keys are only briefly touched. As mentioned at the beginning of this essay, Heidegger wrote that ‘the typewriter tears writing from the essential realm of the hand’: It is only through the kind of narrative so far traced in this essay that this kind of apparently abstruse comment makes sense. Clearly, the typewriter, as Connor is at pains to point out, is still operated by hand. In fact, the similarity between the vision of a truly quick typist in action and the sight of a pianist performing should, according to Connor, lead us consider typewriting as ‘a new modality of music’ (SC, 2) Countering this, Ivan Rakoff has noted the disparity between the ‘dynamic contrasts and tonal shadings’ of the piano and the ‘mechanical’ typewriter.​[31]​ Thus, where pianists could be described as caressing their keys with a lingering touch, typists jab at their buttons with indiscriminate force. More importantly (and more connected to its place in a lineage of writing devices) typing is the work of a hand that doesn’t grasp anything. This is the hand in momentary contact with the world by way of its individual digits – in fact, by way of the very points of the body that delineate our undoubted, yet unrecognizable, identity – the tips of our fingers – in a transitory moment which leaves text as latent print.
Thornton’s analysis of the kind of self that inhered in the handwriting of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries can thus be extended to include the self (or author) that exists (or evades detection) in typewritten text. In this sense, momentary touch becomes a key way to view the disavowal of authorial authority in twentieth-century literary theory. A forerunner of this is Nietszche who, in his final years wrote with a typewriting machine called the Malling-Hausen writing ball. Nietzsche proclaimed, during this time, that ‘our writing tools are also working on our thoughts’ and wrote a poem about his machine which begins: ‘The writing ball is a thing like me’.​[32]​ Here, the distinction between operator and mechanism is blurred and the individual becomes a ‘thing’. This is the typewriter at its most machine-like – not a writing-tool at all – and, as such, it removes the sense of agency with which its user operates it. In fact, the Malling-Hausen, and by extension Nietzsche himself, becomes like Clea’s ‘steel contrivance’, an uncanny ‘accessory-after-the-fact’ of a previously originating hand. 
	The omnipresence of a typewriting aesthetic need not be limited to an analysis of those writers, like Nietzsche, who are definitively known to have typed their work – though it is interesting to note that Durrell wrote all his prose on a typewriter (ref LD conversation, p. 50).​[33]​ The literary forefather, here, is Mark Twain, who was the first to submit a typed manuscript when he published Pudd’nhead Wilson in 1894. T. S. Eliot is also reputed to have written The Waste Land on a typewriter – a fact which lends a new potency to the depiction of the typist who ‘smooths her hair with automatic hand/and puts a record on the gramophone’.​[34]​ What is perhaps more significant in the context so far outlined, though, is Eliot’s famous elision of individual poetic presence. In ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’, Eliot writes that ‘the poet has not a “personality” to express, but a particular medium’. Eliot goes on to pick apart Wordsworth’s dictum that poetry is ‘emotion recollected in tranquillity’: ‘it is neither emotion, nor recollection, nor without distortion of meaning, tranquillity. It is a concentration, and a new thing resulting from the concentration, of a very great number of experiences which to the practical and active person would not seem to be experiences at all’.​[35]​ As any student of literary theory knows, these kinds of arguments gathered continued momentum throughout the twentieth-century, through Russian Formalism, New criticism and various strands of critical theory. Indeed, the most provocative and polemical of these formulations, Roland Barthes’ ‘Death of the Author’ reaches one of its many crescendos when Barthes’ states that: 

Having buried the Author, the modern scriptor can thus no longer believe, as according to the pathetic view of his predecessors, that his hand is too slow for his thought or passion and that consequently, making a law of necessity, he must emphasize this delay and indefinitely “polish” his form. For him, on the contrary, the hand, cut off from any voice, borne by a pure gesture of inscription (and not of expression), traces a field without origin – or which, at least, has no other origin than language itself, language which ceaselessly calls into question all origins.​[36]​
	






Barthes, Roland. "The Death of the Author." In The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, edited by Vincent B. Leitch. New York & London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2010.Classen, Constance, ed. The Book of Touch. Oxford: Berg, 2005.Cole, Simon A. Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001.Danius, Sara. The Sense of Modernism: Technology, Perception, and Aesthetics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.De Maupassant, Guy. Selected Short Stories. Translated by Roger Colet. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971.Dennis, I. H. . The Law of Evidence. 2nd ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002.Derfler, Leslie. The Dreyfus Affair. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002.Doyle, Arthur Conan. The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes. Oxford: Oxford World's Classics, 2008.Durrell, Lawrence. The Alexandrian Quartet. London: Faber and Faber, 1968.———. Conversations. Edited by Earl G. Ingersoll. Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1998.Eliot, T. S. "Tradition and the Individual Talent." In Selected Prose of T. S. Eliot, edited by Frank Kermode. San Diego, CA.: Harcourt, 1975.Eliot, T.S. Collected Poems 1909-1962. London: Faber and Faber, 2002.Freud, Sigmund. The Uncanny. Translated by David McLintock. London: Penguin, 2003.Gitelman, Lisa. Scripts, Grooves, and Writing Machines: Representing Technology in the Edison Era. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. Oxford: Basilo Blackwell, 1978.———. "What Calls for Thinking?" In Basic Writings, edited by David Farrell Krell. London: Routledge, 1993.Johnson, Douglas. France and the Dreyfus Affair. London: Bradford Press, 1966.Keep, Christopher. "Technology and Information: Accelerating Developments." In A Companion to the Victorian Novel, edited by Patrick Brantlinger and William B Thesing. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002.———. "Touching at a Distance: Telegraphy, Gender, and Henry James’s in the Cage." In Media, Technology, and Literature in the Nineteenth Century: Image, Sound, Touch, edited by Collette Colligan and Margaret Linley. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011.Kittler, Freidrich A. Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. Translated by Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.Panchasi, Roxanne. "Graphology and the Science of Individual Identity in Modern France." Configurations 4, no. 1 (1996): 1-31.Raykoff, Ivan. "Piano, Telegraph, Typewriter: Listening to the Language of Touch." In Media, Technology, and Literature in the Nineteenth Century: Image, Sound, Touch, edited by Collette Colligan and Margaret Linley. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011.Seltzer, Mark. Bodies and Machines. New York and Lond: Routledge, 1992.Tallis, Raymond. The Hand: A Philosophical Inquiry into Human Being. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003.Thomas, Ronald R. Detective Fiction and the Rise of Forensic Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.Thornton, Tamara Plakins. Handwriting in America: A Cultural History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996.Wershler-Henry, Darren. The Iron Whim: A Fragmented History of Typewriting. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005.Wordsworth, William, and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Lyrical Ballads 1798 and 1800. Edited by Michael Gamer and Dahlia Porter. Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2008.
Classen, Constance, ed. The Book of Touch. Oxford: Berg, 2005.
Cole, Simon A. Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001.
Danius, Sara. The Sense of Modernism: Technology, Perception, and Aesthetics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.
De Maupassant, Guy. Selected Short Stories. Translated by Roger Colet. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971.
Dennis, I. H. . The Law of Evidence. 2nd ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002.
Derfler, Leslie. The Dreyfus Affair. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002.
Doyle, Arthur Conan. The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes. Oxford: Oxford World's Classics, 2008.
Durrell, Lawrence. The Alexandrian Quartet. London: Faber and Faber, 1968.
———. Conversations. Edited by Earl G. Ingersoll. Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1998.
Eliot, T. S. "Tradition and the Individual Talent." In Selected Prose of T. S. Eliot, edited by Frank Kermode. San Diego, CA.: Harcourt, 1975.
Eliot, T.S. Collected Poems 1909-1962. London: Faber and Faber, 2002.
Freud, Sigmund. The Uncanny. Translated by David McLintock. London: Penguin, 2003.
Gitelman, Lisa. Scripts, Grooves, and Writing Machines: Representing Technology in the Edison Era. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. Oxford: Basilo Blackwell, 1978.
———. "What Calls for Thinking?" In Basic Writings, edited by David Farrell Krell. London: Routledge, 1993.
Johnson, Douglas. France and the Dreyfus Affair. London: Bradford Press, 1966.
Keep, Christopher. "Technology and Information: Accelerating Developments." In A Companion to the Victorian Novel, edited by Patrick Brantlinger and William B Thesing. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002.
———. "Touching at a Distance: Telegraphy, Gender, and Henry James’s in the Cage." In Media, Technology, and Literature in the Nineteenth Century: Image, Sound, Touch, edited by Collette Colligan and Margaret Linley. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011.
Kittler, Freidrich A. Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. Translated by Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.
Panchasi, Roxanne. "Graphology and the Science of Individual Identity in Modern France." Configurations 4, no. 1 (1996): 1-31.
Raykoff, Ivan. "Piano, Telegraph, Typewriter: Listening to the Language of Touch." In Media, Technology, and Literature in the Nineteenth Century: Image, Sound, Touch, edited by Collette Colligan and Margaret Linley. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011.
Seltzer, Mark. Bodies and Machines. New York and Lond: Routledge, 1992.
Tallis, Raymond. The Hand: A Philosophical Inquiry into Human Being. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003.
Thomas, Ronald R. Detective Fiction and the Rise of Forensic Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Thornton, Tamara Plakins. Handwriting in America: A Cultural History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996.
Wershler-Henry, Darren. The Iron Whim: A Fragmented History of Typewriting. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005.











^1	  See Christopher Keep, "Touching at a Distance: Telegraphy, Gender, and Henry James’s In the Cage," in Media, Technology, and Literature in the Nineteenth Century: Image, Sound, Touch, ed. Collette Colligan and Margaret Linley (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011).
^2	  From Parmenides, quoted in  ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Darren Wershler-Henry, The Iron Whim: A Fragmented History of Typewriting (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 136. From Parmenides, quoted in  ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Freidrich A. Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 199.
^3	  Steven Connor, ‘Modernism and the Writing Hand’. Modernism and the Technology of Writing Conference (University of London, 26 March 1999). http://www.stevenconnor.com/modhand.htm. Subsequently to be referenced as SC. On the amputation of the hand see Mark Seltzer, Bodies and Machines. New York and London: Routledge, 1992.
^4	  Guy De Maupassant, Selected Short Stories, trans. Roger Colet (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), 254.. Subsequently to be referenced as GDM.
^5	  The term ‘come into the open’ is part of the definition of the unheimlich given by Schelling and which Freud found so compelling. Sigmund Freud, The Uncanny, trans. David McLintock (London: Penguin, 2003), 132.
^6	   ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Raymond Tallis, The Hand: A Philosophical Inquiry into Human Being (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 12. Subsequently to be referenced as RT.
^7	   ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basilo Blackwell, 1978), 104.
^8	   ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA ———, "What Calls for Thinking?," in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1993), 380-1.
^9	   ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter: 198.
^10	   ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Constance Classen, ed. The Book of Touch (Oxford: Berg,2005), 6.
^11	   ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Tamara Plakins Thornton, Handwriting in America: A Cultural History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), xiii. Subsequently to be referenced as TPT.
^12	  Mark Seltzer, Bodies and Machines (New York and Lond: Routledge, 1992), 10.
^13	  William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Lyrical Ballads 1798 and 1800, ed. Michael Gamer and Dahlia Porter (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2008), 183.
^14	  Lawrence Durrell, The Alexandrian Quartet (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), 852. Subsequently to be referenced as LD.
^15	   ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Leslie Derfler, The Dreyfus Affair (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 68.
^16	  Quoted in  ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Douglas Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair (London: Bradford Press, 1966), 20.
^17	   ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Roxanne Panchasi, "Graphology and the Science of Individual Identity in Modern France," Configurations 4, no. 1 (1996): 26.
^18	  Ian Dennis writes that 'well-known cases of miscarriage of justice resulting from mistaken evidence of identity start with Adolf Beck’.  ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA I. H.  Dennis, The Law of Evidence, 2nd ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), 216.
^19	  Quoted in  ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Simon A. Cole, Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 87.
^20	   ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Ronald R. Thomas, Detective Fiction and the Rise of Forensic Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 204.
^21	   ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Ibid., 11.
^22	   ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Cole, Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification: 167.
^23	   ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Sara Danius, The Sense of Modernism: Technology, Perception, and Aesthetics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 3.
^24	  Quoted in  ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter: 14.
^25	   ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Wershler-Henry, The Iron Whim: A Fragmented History of Typewriting: 36.
^26	  Quoted in  ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Classen, The Book of Touch, 407.
^27	   ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter: 191.
^28	   ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Ibid., 14. Christopher Keep, "Technology and Information: Accelerating Developments," in A Companion to the Victorian Novel, ed. Patrick Brantlinger and William B Thesing (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 147.
^29	   ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes (Oxford: Oxford World's Classics, 2008), 44.
^30	  From Parmenides, quoted in  ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter: 199. For a description of the typewriter as ‘black box’ see Lisa Gitelman, Scripts, Grooves, and Writing Machines: Representing Technology in the Edison Era (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 205.
^31	  Ivan Raykoff, "Piano, Telegraph, Typewriter: Listening to the Language of Touch," in Media, Technology, and Literature in the Nineteenth Century: Image, Sound, Touch, ed. Collette Colligan and Margaret Linley (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), 175.
^32	  Quoted in  ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter: 200 & 07.
^33	  Lawrence Durrell, Conversations, ed. Earl G. Ingersoll (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1998), 50.
^34	  T. S. Eliot, The Waste Land, in T.S. Eliot, Collected Poems 1909-1962 (London: Faber and Faber, 2002), 255-6.
^35	   ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA T. S. Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent," in Selected Prose of T. S. Eliot, ed. Frank Kermode (San Diego, CA.: Harcourt, 1975), 43. Similarly, (though he didn’t use a typewriter) Marcel Proust, in his Contre Sainte-Beuve, argues against the literary criticism of Sainte-Beuve, in which knowledge of the author’s biography was crucial to understanding their work.
^36	  Roland Barthes, "The Death of the Author," in The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, ed. Vincent B. Leitch (New York & London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2010), 1324.
^37	  Seltzer, Bodies and Machines: 16.
^38	  Ivan Raykoff also notes Marshall McLuhan’s belief that the typewriter gave figures such as Eliot and Pound ‘the colloquial freedom of the world of jazz and ragtime’. Raykoff, "Piano, Telegraph, Typewriter: Listening to the Language of Touch," 176.
